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Abstract
Uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models is a central concern
for optimal policy when policy prescriptions from those models diﬀer. The standard
procedure is to specify a prior over the parameter space ignoring the special status
of some sub-models, e.g. those resulting from zero restrictions. This is especially
problematic if a model’s generalization could be either true progress or the latest fad
found to ﬁt the data. We propose a procedure that ensures that the speciﬁed set of sub-
models is not discarded too easily and thus receives no weight in determining optimal
policy. We ﬁnd that optimal policy based on our procedure leads to substantial welfare
gains compared to the standard practice.
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11 Introduction
Recently, the empirical evaluation of Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) mod-
els employing Bayesian methods has made substantial progress (Smets and Wouters, 2003,
2007; An and Schorfheide, 2007; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2004). Policymakers nowadays cor-
respondingly employ relatively large estimated DSGE models, including various features and
frictions, in their policy analysis more and more. This practice is based on the implicit idea
that by capturing many aspects of the economy in one single model, policy prescriptions de-
rived from this model should guard against the risks of an uncertain economic environment.1
However, as it ignores the special status of sub-models that are deﬁned by zero restrictions,
the recent practice is prone to uncertainty about the appropriate choice of nested models.
We show that this source of uncertainty is a central concern for optimal policy and propose
a procedure that insures against it by assigning a non-zero weight to the set of sub-models.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the following situation. After some process of theorizing and data
analysis, a policymaker has arrived at a baseline model, Model 𝐴. One day, a researcher
proposes to extend this model by adding a new feature or friction, replacing it with Model
𝐵,i nw h i c hM o d e l𝐴 is nested. At a ﬁrst glance, this seems to be a win-win situation
b e c a u s et h en e wm o d e ln e s t sa l lt h ea d v a n t a g e so fM o d e l𝐴 and moreover may improve the
understanding of the economy and lead the policymaker to make better policy decisions.
However, the gain in explanatory power may be relatively small, i.e. the posterior odds
may not indicate substantial evidence against Model 𝐴. Discarding Model 𝐴 is further
problematic because instead of true improvement, Model 𝐵 may be just the latest fad found
to ﬁt the data. When Model 𝐵 introduces a conﬂicting stabilization aim into the decision
about policy, optimal policy prescriptions from the two models diﬀer. In this situation, the
policymaker risks welfare losses by ignoring Model 𝐴 and putting all her eggs in one basket.
In this paper, we develop an approach that takes into account both Models 𝐴 and 𝐵 to
determine optimal policy.
Starting with a baseline model, we subsequently estimate a set of competing and nested
models. This bottom-up approach puts us into a position to separately evaluate the gain in
explanatory power of each extension. Optimal policy is then computed by weighting each
model with its posterior probability. Weighting over the set of nested models allows the
policymaker to make reasonable extensions of the baseline model but also insure against the
pitfalls of only employing one potentially misspeciﬁed model.
Using Euro-13 area data, we illustrate our approach to deal with model uncertainty in
1Exemplary papers that fall in this category are Levin, Onatski, Williams, and Williams (2005), Chris-
tiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2007), and more recently Adolfson, Laseen, Linde, and Svensson (2008).
2nested models by choosing as a baseline model one of the most popular models employed in
monetary analysis nowadays: a standard cashless New Keynesian economy with staggered
price-setting without indexation (Woodford, 2003a). As examples of uncertainty linked to
the choice between nested models, we subsequently allow for more lags in endogenous vari-
ables (indexation and habit formation) and omitted variables (money). To represent the
standard practice, we also consider one model that nests all these features. While the pre-
dominant principle of optimal policy in cashless models is price stability, a demand for money
introduces a conﬂicting policy aim, namely the stabilization of the nominal interest rate. In
this environment, we ﬁnd that our procedure leads to welfare gains of approximately 70
percent compared to the standard practice.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce our
approach to analyze the optimal conduct of policy under model uncertainty. In Section 3
we describe the baseline model and its extensions. In Section 4 we present our estimation
results and its consequences for optimal monetary policy. The last section concludes.
2 Analyzing optimal policy under model uncertainty
In this section, after a short description of the general setup we present two approaches to
cope with model uncertainty and describe how we assess the policy performance under model
uncertainty. The ﬁrst approach is set to represent the standard practice: without paying
special attention to the set of sub-models, the policymaker determines optimal policy by
maximizing households’ utility within one single model that nests all features and frictions.
The second approach takes uncertainty about the appropriate choice of nested models into
account and weights over the set of nested models to derive optimal policy prescriptions.
2.1 General setup
Consider a system of linear equations that represent log-linear approximations to the non-
linear equilibrium conditions under rational expectations around a deterministic steady state
of a particular Model 𝑖.L e t 𝑥𝑡 be the vector of state variables, 𝑧𝑡 the vector of structural
shocks and 𝑦𝑡 the vector of observable variables. Furthermore, let Θ𝑖 denote the random
vector of deep parameters and 𝜃𝑖 a particular realization from the joint posterior distribution
in Model 𝑖. Policy inﬂuences the equilibrium outcome through simple feedback rules. The
link between the set of policy instruments as a subset of 𝑥 is characterized by the vector of
3constant policy coeﬃcients 𝜙, i.e. by deﬁnition we consider steady state invariant policies.2
The state space form of the solution of model 𝑖 is given by3:
ˆ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑇(𝜃𝑖,𝜙)ˆ 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑅(𝜃𝑖,𝜙)𝑧𝑡 (1)
ˆ 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐺ˆ 𝑥𝑡, (2)
where 𝑇(𝜃𝑖,𝜙)a n d𝑅(𝜃𝑖,𝜙) are matrices one obtains after solving a DSGE model with stan-
dard solution techniques. The matrix 𝐺 is a picking matrix that equates observable and
state variables.
We assess the performance of a particular policy 𝜙 by its eﬀects on households’ uncon-
ditional expected utility, i.e. before any uncertainty has been resolved. In Model 𝑖 and for






















This approximation decomposes households’ utility in two parts. The ﬁrst part is utility
in the steady state, and the second part comprises welfare-reducing ﬂuctuations around the
long-run equilibrium. We assume that the policymaker can credibly commit to a policy
rule 𝜙: if a policymaker decides to follow a certain policy rule 𝜙 once and forever, agents
believe indeed that the policymaker will. Given a particular value 𝜃𝑖, the optimal steady
state invariant policy 𝜙★
𝑖(𝜃𝑖) maximizes (3) by minimizing short-run ﬂuctuations captured in
𝐿(𝜃𝑖,ˆ 𝑥). Since the speciﬁcation of households’ preferences is independent of policy choices,
the policymaker can only indirectly inﬂuence households’ loss by shaping the dynamics of
the endogenous variables ˆ 𝑥 as deﬁned by (1).
2.2 Two approaches to model uncertainty
We now turn to the optimal conduct of policy if the policymaker faces uncertainty about
the economic environment. We consider two approaches to cope with this uncertainty.
Specifying a marginal prior distribution with a positive unique mode for each parameter,
the ﬁrst approach or the standard practice is to develop and estimate one single model that
nests all features and frictions and employ the model in determining optimal policy. This
2A steady state-invariant policy is a policy which aﬀects the dynamic evolution of the endogenous variables
around a steady state, but not the steady state itself.
3ˆ 𝑥𝑡 denotes the percentage deviation of the generic variable 𝑥𝑡 from a deterministic steady state 𝑥 chosen
as approximation point.
4is based on the idea that by capturing many aspects of the economy in one single model,
policy prescriptions derived from this model should guard against the risks of an uncertain
economic environment. The only source of uncertainty for the policymaker is uncertainty
about the structural parameters of the model. We refer to this approach as the complete-
model approach.
The second approach starts with a stylized baseline model and treats each extension by
an additional feature or friction as a distinct and competing model. By averaging across
models, this approach allows to take not only parameter uncertainty but also uncertainty
about model speciﬁcation into account. In the following we refer to this approach as the
model-averaging approach.
When pursuing the ﬁrst approach to deal with model uncertainty, the relevant uncertainty
that a policymaker faces when she makes her decision about 𝜙 is given by the joint posterior
distribution in the model that nests all features and frictions. We denote this ’complete’
model by Model c and its corresponding posterior distribution of its structural parameters
by 𝑓(𝜃𝑐) ≡ 𝑓(𝜃∣𝑌,ℳc), where 𝑌 is the set of time series used in the estimation. The optimal
policy (𝜙★





𝐸Θc𝐿(Θc,ˆ 𝑥)( 4 )
𝑠.𝑡. ˆ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑇(𝜃c,𝜙)ˆ 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑅(𝜃c,𝜙)𝑧𝑡, ∀𝜃c,
where 𝐸Θc𝐿(Θc,ˆ 𝑥) is the expected loss when the structural parameters are a random vector.
Due to parameter uncertainty the policymaker has to average the loss over all possible
realizations of Θc to ﬁnd the optimal vector of constant policy coeﬃcients in Model c, 𝜙★
c.
The second approach explicitly addresses speciﬁcation uncertainty and averages over dif-
ferent models. We separately estimate a discrete set of nested models ℳ = {ℳ1,...,ℳc},
where ℳ1 denotes the baseline model, ℳc the complete model and (c − 2) possible one-
feature extensions of the baseline model. Employing the same data and prior speciﬁca-
tion of shocks and common parameters, we calculate marginal data densities 𝑝(𝑌 ∣ℳ𝑖)=
𝐸(𝑓(𝑌 ∣Θ𝑖)), where 𝑓(𝑌 ∣Θ𝑖) denotes the data likelihood and the expectation is taken with
respect to the prior distribution of the structural parameters. Since all models are nested in
Model c, the marginal data density for Model 𝑖 satisﬁes:
𝑝(𝑌 ∣ℳ𝑖) ≡ 𝑝(𝑌 ∣𝜃c∕∈𝑖 = 0,ℳc), (5)
where 𝜃c∕∈𝑖 denotes the vector of structural parameters for Model c that are not contained in
5the set of structural parameters of Model 𝑖 =1 ,2,...c. We employ the harmonic mean esti-
mator to compute the data likelihood in a certain model as proposed by Geweke (1999) and
more recently applied among others by An and Schorfheide (2007). To compare the explana-
tory power of each model relative to the other models, we compute posterior probabilities






where 𝑃(𝑀𝑖) denotes the prior probability for each model.4 To ensure that sub-models are
not discarded too easily and to facilitate competition between the nested models, we assign
positive and equal prior weights to each model. The posterior probability of each model is
then solely determined by its relative success to explain a given set of time series, i.e. it
takes a value close to zero when the predictive density of a model relative to the others is
neglectable.
In nested models, the second approach can also be thought of as deﬁning a bimodal prior
distribution for the parameter that represents the additional feature or friction. One part
of the distribution is centered around the assumed positive modulus of the parameter, and
the other modulus is centered around zero. The idea of paying special attention to this zero
restriction and giving this possibility relatively more weight reﬂects the natural scepticism
every researcher and policymaker has when extending a reasonable model.
Our approach however is more general than specifying bimodal prior distributions because
it can also be applied when models are not nested. In particular, it avoids a discontinuity
problem in the parameter space that arises when models are not nested. To see this, suppose
that the baseline model ℳ1 is replaced by a very similar model ℳ∗
1 that is not nested in the
complete Model c. In other words, there is at least one parameter that is not included in the
prior speciﬁcation of the complete model. In this case, it seems to be reasonable to weight
over all models, also including ℳ∗
1. The complete-model approach – even if it includes a
bimodal prior speciﬁcation – gives zero weight to the parameter included in ℳ∗
1 but not
in Model c. The model-averaging approach weights over models independent whether they
are nested or not, and thereby avoids this discontinuity. In addition, the formulation of a
bimodal prior distribution in standard Bayesian model estimation is not straightforward and
estimating a model extension to zero might cause serious troubles when approximating the
posterior mean.
4An alternative approach to compute posterior model probabilities in nested models involves calculating
Savage-Dickey density ratios as proposed by Verdinelli and Wasserman (1995).
6The optimal policy for the model-averaging approach (𝜙★





𝐸ℳ,Θ𝐿(Θ𝑖,ˆ 𝑥)( 7 )
𝑠.𝑡. ˆ 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑇(𝜃𝑖,𝜙)ˆ 𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑅(𝜃𝑖,𝜙)𝑧𝑡, ∀𝜃𝑖,𝑖 =1 ,...,𝑛.
The complete-model approach is a limiting case of model-averaging approach; they are
equivalent if the complete model exhibits a posterior probability of unity.
2.3 Assessing policy performance within and across models
We compare the performance of the two approaches by computing the average costs of
welfare relevant short-run ﬂuctuations over all draws and models. This allows us to assess
the pitfalls of employing only one model that nests all features and frictions in the policy
analysis, i.e. focussing on parameter uncertainty in the complete model and thereby ignoring
the issue of speciﬁcation uncertainty about nested models. Throughout the paper we express
the resulting business cycle costs (ℬ??) as the percentage loss in certainty (steady state)
equivalent consumption. First we compute the loss of a certain policy ˜ 𝜙 given a particular
parameter vector ˜ 𝜃 in model 𝑖 to derive overall utility:
𝑈
(
𝑐(˜ 𝜃𝑖),𝑥 ∖𝑐(˜ 𝜃𝑖), ˜ 𝜃𝑖
)
− 𝐿(˜ 𝜃𝑖, ˜ 𝜙),
where the ﬁrst term is steady state utility and 𝑥∖𝑐 denotes the variables vector excluding con-
sumption. Since we want to express utility as reduction in certainty consumption equivalents
we set this expression to be equal to:
𝑈
(
𝑐(˜ 𝜃𝑖)(1 −ℬ??),𝑥 ∖𝑐(˜ 𝜃𝑖), ˜ 𝜃𝑖
)
and solve for ℬ?? in percentage terms. Under parameter uncertainty this results in a distri-
bution for ℬ??(˜ 𝜃𝑖, ˜ 𝜙)o v e rΘ 𝑖. Taking the expectation of this expression yields a measure of
the average losses in certainty consumption equivalents under a particular policy ˜ 𝜙.
As can be seen from (3), theoretical unconditional second moments derived from the
DSGE model are relevant for households’ utility losses due to short ﬂuctuations – and
thus for the computation of business-cycle costs under diﬀerent policies. As Del Negro
and Schorfheide (2008) point out, whether the theoretical unconditional moments relevant
for policy assessment and the ones observed in the data coincide depends in particular on the
speciﬁcation of the prior distribution of standard deviations and autoregressive coeﬃcients
for the driving exogenous disturbances. We choose the prior distribution for the standard
7deviations of the 𝑖.𝑖.𝑑. terms in 𝑧𝑡 and the autoregressive coeﬃcients of the shocks contained
in 𝑇(∙) such that the relevant theoretical unconditional second moments at the posterior
mean in each model are in line the ones computed directly from the stationary times se-
ries. This in turn yields welfare costs of short run ﬂuctuations consistent with the limit put
forward by Lucas (2003).
3 Optimal monetary policy: the economic environment
To demonstrate our main result, we create a set of monetary models including one model that
nests all features and frictions. Starting with a plain-vanilla cashless new Keynesian economy
as our baseline model (Woodford, 2003a), we subsequently introduce two additional features
(indexation and habit formation) and a transaction friction (money in the utility function).
While optimal policy in the baseline model and in the models that feature indexation and
habit formation seeks to stabilize ﬂuctuations in inﬂation and in the output gap, a transaction
friction adds the stabilization of the nominal interest rate as an additional and conﬂicting
policy aim. In this section we describe the models, derive the equations characterizing the
equilibrium and the relevant policy objectives as the unconditional expectation of households’
utility for each model.
3.1 The baseline economy: Model 1
The baseline economy consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely-lived households indexed with
𝑗 ∈ [0,1] that have identical initial asset endowments and identical preferences. Household
𝑗 acts as a monopolistic supplier of labor services 𝑙𝑗. Lower (upper) case letters denote real
(nominal) variables. At the beginning of period 𝑡, households’ ﬁnancial wealth comprises a
portfolio of state contingent claims on other households yielding a (random) payment 𝑍𝑗𝑡,
and one-period nominally non-state contingent government bonds 𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 carried over from
the previous period. Assume that ﬁnancial markets are complete, and let 𝑞𝑡,𝑡+1 denote the
period 𝑡 price of one unit of currency in a particular state of period 𝑡 + 1 normalized by the
probability of occurrence of that state, conditional on the information available in period
𝑡. Then, the price of a random payoﬀ 𝑍𝑡+1 in period 𝑡 +1i sg i v e nb y𝐸𝑡[𝑞𝑡,𝑡+1𝑍𝑗𝑡+1]. The
budget constraint of the representative household reads
𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝐸𝑡[𝑞𝑡,𝑡+1𝑍𝑗𝑡+1]+𝑃𝑡𝑐𝑗𝑡 ≤ 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑤𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑗𝑡 +
∫ 1
0
𝐷𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖 − 𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡, (8)
8where 𝑐𝑡 denotes a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate of consumption with elasticity of substitution
𝜁, 𝑃𝑡 the aggregate price level, 𝑤𝑗𝑡 the real wage rate for labor services 𝑙𝑗𝑡 of type 𝑗, 𝑇𝑡 a
lump-sum tax, 𝑅𝑡 the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds, and 𝐷𝑖𝑡 dividends





𝑡{𝑢(𝑐𝑗𝑡) − 𝑣(𝑙𝑗𝑡)},𝗽 ∈ (0,1), (9)
where 𝗽 denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function is as-
sumed to be non-decreasing in consumption, decreasing in labor time, strictly concave,
twice diﬀerentiable, and to fulﬁll the Inada conditions. Households are wage-setters sup-







𝑗𝑡 𝑑𝑗. We assume that the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent
t y p e so fl a b o r ,𝜖𝑡 > 1, varies exogenously over time. Cost minimization implies that the de-
mand for diﬀerentiated labor services 𝑙𝑗𝑡,i sg i v e nb y𝑙𝑗𝑡 =( 𝑤𝑗𝑡/𝑤𝑡)−𝜖𝑡𝑙𝑡, where the aggregate










𝑖𝜆𝑗𝑡+𝑖(𝐵𝑗𝑡+𝑖 + 𝑍𝑗𝑡+1+𝑖)/𝑃𝑗𝑡+𝑖 = 0 (10)
.
The ﬁnal consumption good 𝑌𝑡 is an aggregate of diﬀerentiated goods produced by mo-









with 𝜁>1. Let 𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑃𝑡 denote the price of good 𝑖 set by ﬁrm 𝑖 and the price index
for the ﬁnal good. The demand for each diﬀerentiated good is 𝑦𝑑
𝑖𝑡 =( 𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝑃𝑡)












𝑗𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑗]𝜖𝑡/(𝜖𝑡−1): 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑡,w h e r e𝑙𝑡 =
∫ 1
0 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖 and 𝑎𝑡 is a productivity
shock with mean 1. Labor demand satisﬁes: 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡/𝑎𝑡,w h e r e𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡 denotes real
marginal costs independent of the quantity that is produced by the ﬁrm. We allow for a
nominal rigidity in form of a staggered price setting as developed by Calvo (1983). Each
period ﬁrms may reset their prices with probability 1−𝗼 independently of the time elapsed
since the last price setting. A fraction 𝗼 ∈ [0,1) of ﬁrms are assumed to keep their previous
period’s prices, 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1.I ne a c hp e r i o dam e a s u r e1− 𝗼 of randomly selected ﬁrms set











where 𝜏 denotes an exogenous sales tax. We assume that ﬁrms have access to contingent
9claims.
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑡/Δ𝑡, (12)
where Δ𝑡 =
∫ 1
0 (𝑃𝑖𝑡/𝑃𝑡)−𝜁𝑑𝑖 ≥ 1 and thus Δ𝑡 =( 1− 𝗼)(˜ 𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡)−𝜁 + 𝗼𝜋
𝜁
𝑡Δ𝑡−1. The dispersion
measure Δ𝑡 captures the welfare decreasing eﬀects of staggered price setting. Goods’ market
clearing requires
𝑐𝑡 + 𝑔𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡. (13)
The central bank as the monetary authority is assumed to control the short-term interest
rate 𝑅𝑡 with a simple feedback rule contingent on past interest rates, inﬂation and output:
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑡−1,𝜋 𝑡,𝑦 𝑡). (14)
The consolidated government budget constraint reads: 𝑅𝑡−1𝐵𝑡−1 + 𝑃𝑡𝐺𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑃𝑡𝑇𝑡 +
∫ 1
0 𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝜏𝑑𝑖. The exogenous government expenditures 𝑔𝑡 evolve around a mean ¯ 𝑔, which is
restricted to be a constant fraction of output, ¯ 𝑔 =¯ 𝑦(1 − 𝑠𝑐). We assume that tax policy





We collect the exogenous disturbances in the vector 𝜉𝑡 =[ 𝑎𝑡,𝑔 𝑡,𝜇 𝑡], where 𝜇𝑡 = 𝜖𝑡
𝜖𝑡−1
is a wage mark-up shock. It is assumed that the percentage deviations of the ﬁrst two
elements of the vector from their means evolve according to autonomous AR(1)-processes




𝑡 ], are assumed to be i.i.d..
The recursive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Given initial values 𝑃𝑡0−1 > 0 and Δ𝑡0−1 ≥ 1, a monetary policy and a Ricar-
dian ﬁscal policy 𝑇𝑡 ∀𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0, and a sales tax 𝜏, a rational expectations equilibrium (REE)
for 𝑅𝑡 ≥ 1, is a set of sequences {𝑦𝑡, 𝑐𝑡, 𝑙𝑡, 𝑚𝑐𝑡, 𝑤𝑡, Δ𝑡, 𝑃𝑡, ˜ 𝑃𝑖𝑡,𝑅𝑡}∞
𝑡=𝑡0 for {𝜉𝑡}∞
𝑡=𝑡0
(i) that solve the ﬁrms’ problem (11) with ˜ 𝑃𝑖𝑡 = ˜ 𝑃𝑡,
(ii) that maximize households’ utility (9) s.t. their budget constraints (8),
(iii) that clear the goods market (13),
(iv) and that satisfy the aggregate resource constraint (12) and the transversality condition
(10).
In the next step, we seek to estimate the model by employing Bayesian methods. To
do so, we log-linearize the structural equations around the deterministic steady state under
10zero inﬂation. Thus, the dynamics in the baseline economy are described by the following
two structural equations:
𝜎(𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡+1)=𝜎(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 )+ˆ 𝑅𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝜋𝑡+1 − ˆ 𝑅
𝑛
𝑡 (15)
ˆ 𝜋𝑡 = 𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝜅(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 ), (16)
where 𝜎 = −𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑐/(𝑢𝑐𝑠𝑐), 𝜔 = 𝑣𝑙𝑙𝑙/𝑣𝑙 and 𝜅 =( 1− 𝗼)(1 − 𝗼𝗽)(𝜔 + 𝜎)/𝗼. Furthermore, ˆ 𝑘𝑡
denotes the percentage deviation of a generic variable 𝑘𝑡 from its steady-state value 𝑘.T h e
natural rates of output and interest, i.e the values for output and real interest under ﬂexible








𝑡 = 𝜎[(˜ 𝑔𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 ) − 𝐸𝑡(˜ 𝑔𝑡+1 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡+1)],
where ˜ 𝑔𝑡 =( 𝑔𝑡 − 𝑔)/𝑦. The model is closed by a simple interest rate feedback rule as an
approximation to (14):
ˆ 𝑅𝑡 = 𝜌𝑅 ˆ 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝜋ˆ 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦ˆ 𝑦𝑡. (17)
The general system (1) in the baseline model then is the fundamental locally stable and
unique solution that satisﬁes (15)-(17) for a certain vector of constant policy coeﬃcients
𝜙 =( 𝜌𝑅,𝜙 𝜋,𝜙 𝑦).
Our welfare measure is the unconditional expectation of representative households’ util-
ity. Building on Woodford (2003a), after averaging over all households, a second-order





{𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝜋𝑡)+𝜆𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡)}, (18)
where 𝜆𝑑 = 𝜅/𝜁 and the eﬃcient rate of output is given by
ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 = ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 + ˆ 𝜇𝑡/(𝜔 + 𝜎).
In the next subsection we consider habit formation and indexation to past inﬂation as ex-
amples of missing lags in consumption and inﬂation.
5Throughout we assume that the steady state is rendered eﬃcient by an appropriate setting of the sales
tax rate.
113.2 Habit formation (Model 2) and indexation (Model 3)
One example of a missing lag in an endogenous variable is to allow for an internal habit
(e.g. Boivin and Giannoni (2006); Woodford (2003a)) in households’ total consumption.
The constituting equations for (1) are the policy rule (17) and the modiﬁed versions of the
Euler equation and the New Keynesian Philips curve:
𝜑[𝑑𝑡 − 𝜂𝑑𝑡−1] − 𝜑𝗽𝜂𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝜂𝑑𝑡]=𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝜋𝑡+1 + ˆ 𝑅
𝑛
𝑡 − ˆ 𝑅𝑡...
+ 𝐸𝑡𝜑[𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝜂𝑑𝑡] − 𝜑𝗽𝜂𝐸𝑡[𝑑𝑡+2 − 𝜂𝑑𝑡+1]( 1 9)
ˆ 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜅ℎ[(𝑑𝑡 − 𝗿
∗𝑑𝑡−1) − 𝗽𝗿
∗𝐸𝑡(𝑑𝑡+1 − 𝗿
∗𝑑𝑡)] + 𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝜋𝑡+1, (20)
where 𝑑𝑡 = ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦𝑛
𝑡 , 𝜅ℎ = 𝜂𝜑𝜅[𝗿∗(𝜔 + 𝜎)]−1, 𝜑 = 𝜎/(1 − 𝜂𝗽), and the natural rate of output
follows6
[𝜔 + 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)]ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 − 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡+1 = 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)˜ 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜑𝜂˜ 𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑡+1...
+( 1 + 𝜔)ˆ 𝑎𝑡 − ˆ 𝜇𝑡.




2𝜅ℎ𝗿∗ {𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝜋𝑡)+𝜆𝑑,ℎ𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 − 𝗿
∗(ˆ 𝑦𝑡−1 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡−1))}, (21)
where 𝜆𝑑,ℎ = 𝜅ℎ/𝜁 and the eﬃcient rate of output is characterized by
[𝜔 + 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)]ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 − 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡+1 = 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)˜ 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜑𝜂˜ 𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑡+1...
+( 1 + 𝜔)ˆ 𝑎𝑡.
Like habit formation, the indexation of prices to past inﬂation induces the economy to
evolve in a history-dependent way. We assume that the fraction of prices that are not
reconsidered, 𝗼, adjusts according to log𝑃𝑖𝑡 =l o g 𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝗾 log𝜋𝑡−1 with 0 ≤ 𝗾 ≤ 1a s







𝑡. Correspondingly, the economy with indexation is characterized
by a modiﬁed aggregate supply curve
ˆ 𝜋𝑡 − 𝗾ˆ 𝜋𝑡−1 = 𝗽𝐸𝑡(ˆ 𝜋𝑡+1 − 𝗾ˆ 𝜋𝑡)+𝜅(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑡 ), (22)
6The parameter 𝗿∗,0≤ 𝗿∗ ≤ 𝜂, is the smaller root of the quadratic equation 𝜂𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝗿2)=[ 𝜔 + 𝜑(1 +
𝗽𝜂2)]𝗿. This root is assigned to past values of the natural and eﬃcient rate of output in their stationary
solutions.




{𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝜋𝑡 − 𝗾ˆ 𝜋𝑡−1)+𝜆𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡)}, (23)
where 𝜆𝑑 and the eﬃcient rate of output are deﬁned as in the baseline economy.
3.3 Money in the utility function (Model 4)
We introduce a transaction friction by letting real money balances enter households’ utility
in a separable way. More precisely, households’ utility of holding real money balances is
augmented by the amount 𝑧(𝑚𝑡) and a demand equation for real money balances enters the
set of equilibrium conditions. In log-linearized form this additional equilibrium condition is
given by:







where 𝜎𝑚 = −𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑚/𝑧𝑚 and ˆ 𝜆𝑡 denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint




{𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝜋𝑡)+𝜆𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡)+𝜆1𝑅𝑣𝑎𝑟(ˆ 𝑅𝑡)}, (25)
where 𝜆𝑑 = 𝜅/𝜁, 𝜆1𝑅 = 𝜆𝑑𝗽[𝑣(𝜔 + 𝜎)(1 − 𝗽)𝜎𝑚]−1 and 𝑣 = 𝑦/𝑚. The general form (1) has
to satisfy the (15)-(17) and (??).
3.4 The complete model (Model c)
The complete model builds on the baseline model and comprises habit formation, indexation
and money in the utility function. The equilibrium conditions in this case are: (19), (17),
(??)a n d




In the following proposition we state the loss function for Model c.
Proposition 1 If the ﬂuctuations in 𝑦𝑡 around 𝑦, 𝑅𝑡 around 𝑅, 𝜉𝑡 around 𝜉, 𝜋𝑡 around 𝜋
are small enough, (𝑅 − 1)/𝑅 is small enough, and if the steady state distortions 𝜙 vanish






𝑡−𝑡0𝐿(𝜃c,ˆ 𝑥)+𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡,(𝑅 − 1)/𝑅∥
3), (27)















and 𝑣 = 𝑦/𝑚 > 0.
Proof: see appendix A.1.
4 Results
In this section we ﬁrst present and interpret the estimation results. These results will be
key for the assessment of the relevant model uncertainty faced by the policymaker. In the
second part we compute optimal simple rules along with the procedures laid out in section
2. As a standard, we determine optimal monetary policy at the posterior mean, i.e. optimal
policy in the absence of any model uncertainty. Then we analyze optimal policy when there
is uncertainty about the appropriate choice of nested models.
4.1 Data and estimation results
We treat the variables real wage, output and consumer price inﬂation as observable. The
data consists of HP ﬁltered quarterly values of these variables for the EU 13 countries from
1970-2006.7
We calibrate the discount factor to 𝗽 =0 .99, the steady-state fraction of private con-
sumption relative to GDP 𝑐/𝑦 =0 .8 and the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerentiated
goods to 𝜁 = 6 (see Woodford, 2003a). The speciﬁcation of the prior distributions of the
estimated deep parameters closely follows Negro and Schorfheide (2009), Smets and Wouters
(2003) and Smets and Wouters (2007).8 While we assume the disturbances ˜ 𝑔𝑡 and ˆ 𝑎𝑡 to follow
stationary 𝐴𝑅(1) processes, ˆ 𝜇𝑡 is supposed to be 𝑖.𝑖.𝑑.. Since we are interested in evaluating
7The dataset we use was kindly provided by the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (EABCN). For a
description of how this data is constructed see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001).
8See Appendix A.2 Table 6 for a detailed description.
14the explanatory power of each extension of the baseline model separately, common param-
eters in the set of models need to exhibit the same suﬃcient prior statistics. In particular,
the marginal prior distributions for the set of coeﬃcients that describe the shock processes,
𝜓˜ 𝑔,𝜓 𝑎 and 𝜎˜ 𝑔,𝜎 𝑎,𝜎 𝜇, do not change across models, and they are speciﬁed according to the
procedure explained in Section 2.3.
We approximate the joint posterior distribution of structural parameters by drawing
100,000 times employing a standard MCMC-algorithm as described in An and Schorfheide
(2007) and discard the ﬁrst 80,000 draws. The estimation results are displayed in Table 7 and
the posterior and prior distributions are plotted in Figure 1-5 in Appendix A.2. The estimates
of the posterior mean of the degree of relative risk aversion with respect to consumption (𝜎𝑐),
the degree of indexation (𝗾), and the degree of price stickiness (𝗼) correspond almost one-
for-one to the ﬁndings by Smets and Wouters (2003). In line with Woodford (2003a) we
ﬁnd the labor supply decision with respect to changes in the real wage (1/𝜔) to be elastic,
i.e. values for 𝜔 vary between 0.3a n d0 .4. Our estimate of the internal habit parameter
(𝜂) is comparable to Negro and Schorfheide (2009). Real money balances contribute only
separately to households’ utility in Model 4 and Model c and do not inﬂuence the equilibrium
dynamics of output, inﬂation and the real wage. The parameter of relative risk aversion with
respect to real money balances (𝜎𝑚) cannot be identiﬁed and thus the prior distribution and
the posterior distribution are alike (see Figures 4 and 5).
In order to assess the explanatory power of each model, we compute marginal likelihoods
and the corresponding posterior probabilities. The results are presented in Table 1. Here the
key result is, that adding frictions and features to the baseline model does not necessarily
increase the posterior probability. First, enriching the baseline model with a demand for
cash does not increase the marginal likelihood for Model 4: real money balances do not help
to predict the observable variables. Second, although the posterior distribution of the habit
parameter (𝜂) in Model 2 indicates a positive posterior mean of this parameter, a habit in
consumption does not improve the ﬁt to the data. This points to a well-known problem
in Bayesian model estimation: The informative prior on the habit parameter introduces
curvature into the posterior density surface (as pointed out by Poirier (1998) and An and
Schorfheide (2007)). Third, history dependence in inﬂation improves the ﬁt of the model.
With approximately 81% Model 3 exhibits the highest posterior probability. Thus, the
complete model incorporates features that helps to predict the data (indexation) and others
that do not (habit and money). It therefore exhibits a marginal likelihood higher than Model
1 but lower than Model 3.
15Table 1: Posterior probabilities and marginal data densities
𝑀1 𝑀2 𝑀3 𝑀4 𝑀c
𝑝(𝑌 ∣ℳ𝑖) 1683.98 1682.69 1696.83 1683.57 1695.39
𝑃(𝑀𝑖∣𝑌 ) 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.19
The welfare-assessment of optimal and sub-optimal policies in and across models depends
on the magnitude of the resulting stabilization losses, i.e. the welfare relevant unconditional
variances or standard deviations. In our context, these are the unconditional ﬂuctuations
in inﬂation and consumption (expressed in terms of a welfare-relevant output gap) for the
models without a transaction friction (see e.g. (18)), and additionally ﬂuctuations in interest
rates, when money enters the utility function (see e.g (28)). As can be veriﬁed in Table 2, our
estimated theoretical moments at the posterior mean are consistent with the corresponding
ones directly estimated from the stationary times series.
Table 2: Welfare-relevant standard deviations: models vs. data
𝑀1 𝑀2 𝑀3 𝑀4 𝑀c 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑐, ¯ 𝜃𝑖) 0.0070 0.0090 0.0068 0.0070 0.0078 0.0073
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝜋, ¯ 𝜃𝑖) 0.0020 0.0020 0.0023 0.0020 0.0022 0.0020
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑅, ¯ 𝜃𝑖) 0.0028 0.0027 0.0031 0.0028 0.0031 0.0028
In the next section we begin the analysis of optimal policies in and across models.
4.2 Optimal policy at the posterior mean





𝑦)𝑖 at the posterior mean ¯ 𝜃𝑖 for each Model 𝑖, 𝑖 =1 ,2,..,c.T oe a s et h e
numerical computation and to exclude unreasonably high policy responses, we assume the
following bounds for the policy coeﬃcients of the simple interest rate rule:
𝜌𝑅 ∈ [0,20],𝜌 𝜋 ∈ [0,20], and 𝜌𝑦 ∈ [0,20].
The optimal coeﬃcients and the resulting business cycles costs (ℬ??) expressed as equivalent
reductions in steady-state consumption are displayed in Table 3.
16Table 3: Optimal policy at the posterior mean (𝜙★
𝑖)
ˆ 𝑅𝑡 = 𝜌𝑅 ˆ 𝑅𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝜋ˆ 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜙𝑦ˆ 𝑦𝑡
𝑀1 𝑀2 𝑀3 𝑀4 𝑀c
𝜌𝑅 0.81 1.05 0.62 1.26 1.36
𝜙𝜋 20.00 20.00 20.00 2.42 1.01
𝜙𝑦 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
ℬ??(¯ 𝜃𝑖,𝜙 ★
𝑖) 0.0014% 0.0014% 0.0020% 0.0194% 0.0178%
Optimal policies are characterized by drawing on past interest rates. Put diﬀerently, optimal
policy is history-dependent (Woodford, 2003a,b). In the ﬁrst three models inﬂation stabi-
lization is the predominant aim. Correspondingly, optimal policies feature a strong reaction
on inﬂation.9 In Models 4 and c, households value real money balances as a medium for
transactions. This introduces stabilization of the nominal interest rate as a conﬂicting aim
to price stability (see (25) and (27)) in the presence of ﬂuctuations in the natural rate of
interest. For intuition on this, suppose that 𝜙𝑦 is small and that the economy in Model 1 is
hit by a wage-markup shock. To ﬁght inﬂationary tendencies the output gap must decrease
according to the aggregate supply curve (16). This in turn requires a strong increase in the
nominal interest rate to fulﬁl the Euler equation (15), since the cost-push shock aﬀects the
natural rate of interest. Therefore, optimal policies in models with a demand for cash exhibit
a higher coeﬃcient 𝜌𝑅 to smooth interest rates and a less aggressive response to inﬂation.
Welfare costs in models that feature a transaction friction are substantially higher. This
increase is due to two eﬀects. First, the stabilization of the interest rate adds a new com-
ponent to the welfare-relevant stabilization loss, which accounts for over ﬁfty percent of the
increase in business cycle costs in Model 4 relative to Model 1. The second eﬀect relates
to the conﬂict of stabilizing interest rates, inﬂation and the output gap simultaneously, as
apparent in the muted response to inﬂation in the optimal rules for Models 4 and c.T h e
resulting increase in the unconditional weighted variances of inﬂation and the output gap
accounts for the remaining increase in the costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations.
9The optimal policy response on inﬂation in these models always corresponds to its upper bound. However,
the welfare comparison between the two approaches to model uncertainty is independent of the particular
choice of the upper bound on the inﬂation response.
17Table 4: The weights 𝜆𝑑 and 𝜆𝑅 at the posterior mean
Weights 𝑀1 𝑀2 𝑀3 𝑀4 𝑀c
𝜆𝑑 0.0063 0.0231 0.0079 0.0057 0.0328
𝜆𝑅 - - - 0.0602 0.0728
Table 4 shows how the importance of stabilization aims relative to inﬂation for households
changes across models. For example, the stabilization of the output gap is ﬁve times more
important in Model c than in Model 1. In addition, the exact gap that policy should stabilize
to maximize welfare diﬀers (see (18) and (27)). Furthermore, comparing the two models that
feature a demand for cash reveals that the optimal response to changes in inﬂation is larger in
Model 4 than in Model c. Although both speciﬁcations incorporate stabilizing the nominal
interest rate as a policy aim, this aim is relatively more important in Model c than in Model
4.
4.3 Evaluating two approaches to model uncertainty
In this section we quantitatively compare the two approaches to model uncertainty, the
complete-model and the model-averaging approach. We start by determining the set of
policy coeﬃcients for the former approach according to (5), which yields
𝜙
★
c : 𝜌𝑅 =1 .34; 𝜙𝜋 =1 .17; 𝜙𝑦 =0 .00.
However, Model c is not the likeliest model since it also contains features which do not
help to explain the given time series of GDP, inﬂation and the real wage (see Table 1).
A policymaker pursuing a model-averaging approach to model uncertainty weights welfare
losses in a particular model with its posterior probability, i.e. derives an optimal policy over
all draws and models according to (7):
𝜙
★
𝑎 : 𝜌𝑅 =1 .39; 𝜙𝜋 =3 .36; 𝜙𝑦 =0 .00.
Comparing the characteristics of the two rules reveals two similarities and one diﬀerence.
Both rules draw heavily on past interest rates to avoid welfare-reducing ﬂuctuations in the
interest rate in Models 4 and c, and put no emphasize on stabilizing the output gap. The
main diﬀerence between both rules is the preference to stabilize inﬂation. While there is a
conﬂict in stabilizing inﬂation and the nominal interest rate jointly in Model c, this trade-oﬀ
is absent in the likeliest model, Model 3.
18To evaluate the performance of the two approaches as a guard against model uncertainty
we compute the business cycle cost for both policy rules in each Model 𝑖, i.e. ℬ??(Θ𝑖,𝜙 ★
c)a n d
ℬ??(Θ𝑖,𝜙 ★
𝑎)f o r𝑖 =1 ,2,3,4,c.
Table 5: Relative performance of 𝜙★
c and 𝜙★
𝑎
𝑀1 𝑀2 𝑀3 𝑀4 𝑀c 𝑊𝐴
ℬ??(Θ𝑖,𝜙 ★
c)/ℬ??(Θ𝑖,𝜙 ★
𝑎) 2.22 2.16 1.90 1.26 0.74 1.68
𝑊𝐴denotes the posterior-model probability average of business cycle costs.
As can be seen from Table 5, the optimal rule 𝜙★
𝑎 performs twice as good as 𝜙★
c in
Models 1, 2 and 3 where inﬂation stabilization is the predominant principle. Nevertheless,
by reacting less harshly to inﬂation than the optimal rules from those models (see Table
3), it avoids high welfare losses in Model c. On average, optimal policy derived from the
model-averaging approach leads to welfare gains of 68% relative to the optimal policy rule
derived by the complete-model approach.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed how to optimally conduct policy from a Bayesian perspective
when the policymaker faces uncertainty about the appropriate choice among nested models.
In particular, we have compared two approaches to model uncertainty. The complete-model
approach is set to represent the standard practice: without paying special attention to the
set of sub-models, the policymaker determines optimal policy by maximizing households’
utility within one single model that nests all features and frictions. The model-averaging
approach takes uncertainty about the appropriate choice of nested models into account and
weights over the set of nested models to derive optimal policy prescriptions. Using EU-13
data, we ﬁnd that the model-averaging approach leads to welfare gains of approximately 70
percent compared to the standard practice.
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21A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
The period utility function of the average household in equilibrium is given by:
∫ 1
0




To derive (27) we need to impose that, in the optimal steady state, real money balances are
suﬃciently close to being satiated (see Woodford, 2003a, Assumption 6.1) such that we can
treat (𝑅 − 1)/𝑅 as an expansion parameter.
The ﬁrst summand can be approximated to second order by:
𝑢(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜂(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑡−1)) = 𝑢𝑐𝑦(1 − 𝗽𝜂)[ˆ 𝑦𝑡 +
1
2
(1 − 𝜑(1 + 𝜂
2𝗽))ˆ 𝑦
2
𝑡 + 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝜑ˆ 𝑦𝑡(−𝜂𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝗽𝜂𝑔𝑡+1 +( 1+𝜂
2𝗽)𝑔𝑡)] + 𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3), (29)
where we used (𝑥𝑡−𝑥)=𝑥(ˆ 𝑥𝑡+0.5ˆ 𝑥2
𝑡)+??(∥ˆ 𝑥𝑡∥3), 𝜑 = 𝜎
1−𝗽𝜂, t.i.s.p denotes terms independent
of stabilization policy, 𝜎 = −𝑦𝑢11/𝑢1,a n d𝑔𝑡 =( 𝐺𝑡 − 𝐺)/𝑦.
Since 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑎𝑡𝑙𝑡/Δ𝑡, the second term can be approximated by





𝑡 − (1 + 𝜔)ˆ 𝑎𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡 + ˆ Δ𝑡]+𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3), (30)
where we posited that in the equilibrium under ﬂexible wages each household supplies the
same amount of labor, 𝑙 = 𝑦, 𝜔 =
𝑣𝑙𝑙
𝑣𝑙 𝑙, and that due to the existence of an output subsidy
the steady state is rendered eﬃcient with 𝑣𝑙 = 𝑢𝑐(1−𝗽𝜂). In the next step we combine (29)
and (30), employ ˜ 𝑔𝑡 = −𝜂𝑔𝑡−1 − 𝗽𝜂𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑡+1 +( 1+𝜂2𝗽)𝑔𝑡, and obtain:
𝑢(𝑦𝑡 − 𝑔𝑡 − 𝜂(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑔𝑡−1)) −
∫ 1
0




2𝗽) − 𝜔)ˆ 𝑦
2
𝑡
+ 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜑ˆ 𝑦𝑡˜ 𝑔𝑡 +( 1+𝜔)ˆ 𝑎𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ Δ𝑡]+𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3). (31)
The eﬃcient rate of output is deﬁned by the following diﬀerence equation:
[𝜔 + 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)]ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 − 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡−1 − 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡+1 = 𝜑˜ 𝑔𝑡 +( 1+𝜔)ˆ 𝑎𝑡 + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
2).



















− 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡−1 − [𝜔 + 𝜑(1 + 𝗽𝜂
2)]ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡ˆ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜑𝜂ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡−1ˆ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝜑𝜂𝗽𝐸𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡+1ˆ 𝑦𝑡 + ˆ Δ𝑡} + 𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3).
(32)
We seek to rewrite this expression in purely quadratic terms of the welfare-relevant gaps
for inﬂation and output. To do so we apply the method of undetermined coeﬃcients to





𝗿0(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 − 𝗿















∗(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒

















𝑡 − 2ˆ 𝑦𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 − 2𝗿




















2𝗽 +1 )ˆ 𝑦
2
𝑡 − 2𝗿






𝑡+1ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − (2(𝗿
∗)








2𝗽 +1 )ˆ 𝑦
2
𝑡 + 𝗿0𝗿






𝑡+1ˆ 𝑦𝑡 + 𝗿0((𝗿
∗)
2𝗽 +1 )ˆ 𝑦𝑡ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡
are consistent. We use that ˆ 𝑦𝑡0−1 is 𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝.. The parameter 𝗿∗,0≤ 𝗿∗ ≤ 𝜂, is the smaller
root of this quadratic equation: 𝜂𝜑(1+𝗽𝗿2)=[ 𝜔+𝜑(1+𝗽𝜂2)]𝗿. This root is assigned to past















(1 − 𝗼)(1 − 𝗼𝗽)
(ˆ 𝜋𝑡 − 𝗾ˆ 𝜋𝑡−1)
2 + 𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3),









𝗿∗ (ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − ˆ 𝑦
𝑒
𝑡 −𝗿





(1 − 𝗼)(1 − 𝗼𝗽)
(ˆ 𝜋𝑡 −𝗾ˆ 𝜋𝑡−1)
2]
+ 𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝. + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3).
The last approximation needed is that involving the utility of real money balances. Applying
23similar techniques we get
𝑧(𝑚𝑡)=𝑧 + 𝑦𝑢𝑐(𝑠𝑚(ˆ 𝑚𝑡 +
1
2
𝑠𝑚(1 − 𝜎𝑚)ˆ 𝑚
2
𝑡)+𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝 + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∥
3), (33)
where we employ 𝑠𝑚 = 𝑧𝑚𝑚/(𝑢𝑐𝑦)=( 𝑅 − 1)(1 − 𝗽𝜂)𝑅 and 𝜎𝑚 = −𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑚/𝑧𝑚. Since we
treat (𝑅−1)/𝑅 as an expansion parameter, 𝑠𝑚 and 1/𝜎𝑚 are of ﬁrst order. However, 𝑠𝑚𝜎𝑚
















At the limit for (𝑅 − 1)/𝑅 → 0, it follows that 𝜂𝑖 = −𝑢𝑐(1 − 𝗽𝜂)/(𝑧𝑚𝑚𝑚) and therefore
𝑠𝑚𝜎𝑚 =( 1− 𝗽𝜂)/(𝑣𝜂𝑖), with 𝑣 = 𝑦/𝑚. A ﬁrst-order approximation of the money demand
equation (24) yields
ˆ 𝑚𝑡 = −𝜂𝑖 ˆ 𝑅𝑡 −
1
𝜎𝑚
ˆ 𝜆𝑡 + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∣
2),
where
ˆ 𝜆𝑡 = −𝜑(ˆ 𝑦𝑡 − 𝜂ˆ 𝑦𝑡−1)+𝗽𝜂𝜑(ˆ 𝑦𝑡+1 − 𝜂ˆ 𝑦𝑡)+𝜑(𝑔𝑡 − 𝜂𝑔𝑡−1) − 𝗽𝜂𝜑(𝑔𝑡+1 − 𝜂𝑔𝑡)+??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡∣
2).









ˆ 𝑅𝑡)+𝑡.𝑖.𝑠.𝑝 + ??(∥ˆ 𝜉𝑡,(𝑅 − 1)/𝑅∥
3). (34)
We assume for simplicity that [(𝑅 − 1)/𝑅 − 0] is of second order, and sum the results in
expression (27) in the text.
24A.2 Estimation Results
Table 6: Prior distribution of the structural parameters
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
Parameter distribution mean std
𝜌 beta 0.8 0.1
𝜙𝜋 normal 1.7 0.1
𝜙𝑦 normal 0.125 0.05
𝜔 gamma 1 0.5
𝜎𝑐 normal 1.5 0.375
𝗼 beta 0.75 0.05
𝜂 beta 0.7 0.1
𝗾 beta 0.75 0.15
𝜎𝑚 normal 1.25 0.375
𝜓𝑔 beta 0.7 0.1
𝜓𝑎 beta 0.7 0.1
𝜎𝑔 invgamma 0.04 0.026
𝜎𝑎 invgamma 0.04 0.026














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Figure 2: Deep parameters prior vs. posterior distribution in Model 2







































































28Figure 3: Deep parameters prior vs. posterior distribution in Model 3











































































































































30Figure 5: Deep parameters prior vs. posterior distribution in Model 5
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